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POKING HOLES IN THE FABRIC OF TORT:
A COMMENT
Robert L. Rabin*
INTRODUCTION
Ironies abound in the world of tort reform. Indeed, the term itself
has been turned inside out. In its early years, tort reform was prima-
rily concerned with remedying systematic shortfalls in providing com-
pensation to injured workers. More recently, tort reform has come to
be associated with the excessive generosity of damage awards.
Workers' compensation, the first major movement to address the
perceived deficiencies of the tort system, arose out of a continuing
concern that tort law was affording inadequate protection to the vic-
tims of workplace injuries.' The movement led to the wholesale re-
placement of tort law with legislative compensation schemes offering
baseline economic benefits without reference to fault, and without the
harsh defenses previously available to employers. 2 Almost a half cen-
tury later, a persistent pattern of skewed recoveries in auto accident
cases-most strikingly the undercompensation of serious injuries,
many of which were entirely uncompensated-led to a second major
wave of tort reform aimed at replacing the tort system, in part, with a
legislative no-fault motor vehicle compensation scheme. 3 Taken to-
gether, one could say that tort reform was designed to offer recovery
based on an activity-related nexus to victims, including those who fell
outside the structure of a fault-based tort system.
Then the tide turned. Beginning in the mid-1970s and building in
intensity from the mid-1980s on, successive waves of state legislation
addressed the remedial side of tort, establishing ceilings on intangible
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to John W. Elias and
Lincoln Mayer for valuable research assistance.
1. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial A cci-
dents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
2. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933, at 197-202 (1994).
3. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 13, 15-23 (1988).
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losses, punitive damages, and attorney's fees, as well as limiting joint
and several liability and collateral source recovery. 4
A new focal point had been established. Instead of tort being criti-
cized as a lottery in which similarly situated injury victims were
treated dissimilarly or failed to recover at all, the focus in the political
realm shifted to the unpredictability faced by alleged tortfeasors.
With this paradigm shift, the foundational question-whether tort is
the most efficacious system for addressing accidental harm-arose
once more, but from a sharply different perspective. The question
was now whether tort should be diminished in scope, rather than
whether compensation schemes should be adopted to fill the gaps en-
demic to tort.
The reforms of the 1970s diverted attention away from the broader
implications of this turnabout, because these strategies merely
tinkered with the existing system by chipping away at compensation
levels to create greater predictability for risk generators. But regula-
tory preemption, a development on the current reform agenda, forth-
rightly presents the tort replacement strategy first promoted a century
ago in workers' compensation legislation. Has tort reform, in para-
doxical fashion, come full circle?
These are some of the foundational concerns that come to mind in
reviewing the contributions of Professors Catherine Sharkey and John
Witt to this Symposium. 5 At first blush, their papers appear to pursue
quite disparate themes, with Sharkey addressing the regulatory pre-
emption strategy and Witt focusing on the role of the plaintiffs' bar.
But from one important perspective, the papers raise the same ques-
tion: What, if anything, does the tort system provide that is both
unique and worth preserving?
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY-INITIATED PREEMPTION
A. Preclusion on the March?
Federal preemption is, of course, not a newcomer to the accident
law scene. Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has handed
down preemption decisions with sufficient regularity that one might
4. For a brief historical survey, see MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D.
GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 809-14 (8th ed. 2006).
5. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of
Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American
Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
261 (2007).
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fairly say that it is preoccupied with the question. 6 And more than a
decade ago, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,7 a case involving the
preemptive effect of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
the Court made clear that congressional preclusion of "requirements"
inconsistent with statutory standards could be construed to apply not
only to inconsistent state regulatory schemes, but also to state com-
mon-law tort decisions.8 The critical point is that these Supreme
Court decisions addressed the issue of whether regulatory standards
based on statutory preemption provisions preclude more stringent
state common-law rulings.9
In Preemption by Preamble, Sharkey addresses some of the implica-
tions of a recent development that could have a critical impact on the
tort system: the emergence of an agency strategy of incorporating tort
preemption provisions into regulatory standards. In particular,
Sharkey notes that the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have all
relied on this strategy in drafting recent health and safety guidelines. 10
Illustrative is the CPSC's recent fire-resistance standard for bedding
mattresses, to which it appended a preemption provision applying to
"inconsistent state standards and requirements, whether in the form
of positive enactments or court created requirements."11
Sharkey collaborated with Professor Samuel Issacharoff on earlier
work that analyzed this phenomenon and broadly addressed a cluster
of such "backdoor federalization" provisions from a descriptive per-
spective. 12 By contrast, in this article, Sharkey poses a succession of
inquiries, followed by proposals, which are aimed at addressing
whether agency-initiated preemption-that is, preemption invoked by
6. For a discussion of the leading cases, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort
Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law-Defamation, Preemption,
and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1189, 1223-43 (2006).
7. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
8. Id. at 530-31.
9. This datum probably goes a long way in explaining the Supreme Court's "preoccupation,"
as I put it above, with preemption. Congress is notoriously vague about indicating its intent to
preempt, and the Court is in every instance engaged in a particularized exercise of discerning
legislative intent. So, there is virtually no carry-over from one ruling to another in establishing
generally applicable guidelines.
10. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 230-42.
11. Id. at 227 (quoting Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress
Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633)).
12. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1353 (2006).
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agencies in the process of formulating regulatory standards-will cre-
ate deep inroads in the scope of the common-law tort regime.' 3
At the outset, there is the question of whether Congress has, in fact,
provided the regulatory agency with the authority to preempt. If it
has, that is the end of the matter: under the Supremacy Clause, fed-
eral enactments override any state law addressing the same subject
matter.' 4 But Congress has been notoriously vague in indicating its
intention to preempt, let alone its intention to delegate this power to
an agency pursuant to the creation of regulatory authority. 15 As a
consequence, the threshold inquiry is a subtle one. How much judicial
deference is due to an agency when it asserts authority to "preempt by
preamble"? Does the agency receive traditional Chevron deference
or something less? 16 As Sharkey indicates, this remains a contested
question. One can argue, as in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
that the agency is uniquely positioned to assess the impact of poten-
tially competing tort case law on its regulatory program.17 But one
can also argue that this agency expertise, if it has any real substance,
was presumably not lost on Congress. Thus, one would have expected
Congress to clarify its intentions regarding the proper level of judicial
deference due to the agency.
However one resolves this question of deference, there is a correla-
tive question, also posed by Sharkey, about private enforcement. 8
Assuming the federal standard is the only game in town, and state tort
law is entirely displaced, does the federal standard itself create an in-
dependent fount of tort law? Here Sharkey points out a potential
asymmetry suggested by Alexander v. Sandoval,19 where the Supreme
13. By definition, of course, these Supremacy Clause-based inroads in tort will be limited to
areas of potential conflict between federal regulatory and state common-law rules. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text (highlighting the products liability regime as a prime target for
displacement).
Still more salient is the question whether the agencies are inclined to adopt such limitations in
the first instance-a question inextricably linked to the disposition of the Chief Executive. The
link is sharply underscored by President George W. Bush's avowed intent to rein in the tort
system. See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., False Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A27; Rob-
ert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
15. See supra note 9. Congressional ambivalence over adopting an express commitment to
preempt is perhaps most starkly evident in cases like Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000) in which the Court faced the unenviable task of reconciling provisions of a
statute, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, that contained both a pre-
emption provision and a tort "saving" clause.
16. See Sharkey, supra note 5, at 242-47 (discussing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
17. 529 U.S. at 883.
18. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 247-50.
19. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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Court indicated in no uncertain terms that a private right of action can
be implied only where Congress has clearly expressed its intent to al-
low such claims. If Chevron deference is paid to agency-initiated pre-
emption and stringent limitations are placed on implied rights of
action to enforce the federal standards, the aggregate effect is that
regulatory enforcement is truly the only game in town.20 Tort goes by
the boards.
Clearly this prospect troubles Sharkey, although she never quite
comes out and says why. 2t She would blunt the force of agency-initi-
ated regulatory preemption through consultative procedures. She
proposes "a federal-state dialogue," drawing on extant executive or-
ders mandating consultation by federal agencies with state and local
authorities, and an assessment of the federalism impact of regulatory
action.22 Perhaps, she suggests, there might even be resort to the rela-
tive formality of notice-and-comment procedures as a prelude to an-
ticipated preemption. 23
These suggestions seem perfectly sensible to me, but I am nonethe-
less skeptical about whether they would make much of a difference.
Where there is a will, there is a way. Agencies' pro forma compliance
with procedural requirements could be achieved with relative ease.
Surely, the now-familiar concerns of tort critics regarding uniformity,
predictability, and interstate impacts under a decentralized liability
system cannot be lightly dismissed. Although these concerns are not
new, they have not been treated in the past with the salience for
agency-initiated preemption that they now engender. If these con-
cerns undergird a deeper hostility to the tort system that is pervasive
in the current administration, then process-oriented consultative
norms are not likely to be given serious weight. 24
As Sharkey notes throughout, and with particular reference to her
tale of three agencies, the emergent proactive stance by the federal
agencies vis-A-vis tort law, which views the latter as competitive rather
than complementary, is a distinct departure from the past. But why
might one urge a cautious approach to overriding tort?
20. As Sharkey mentions, this conclusion rests on a third premise as well-that is, that an
independent state tort negligence per se action, based on the federal regulatory standard, is
similarly rebuffed. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 250.
21. See id. at 228-29 (referring to the substitution of exclusively public remedies for private
rights of action as a "troubling asymmetry," and as "a disconcerting scenario").
22. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4731 (Feb. 7, 1996); Exec. Order No.
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
23. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 257.
24. See Black et al., supra note 13 (discussing Bush's tort reform efforts); Pear, supra note 13
(same).
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B. What Might Be Lost?
Let me begin from a historical perspective. Witt offers the interest-
ing thesis that the early organizational success of the tort plaintiffs'
bar turned on a sustained critique of the unchecked discretionary
character of alternatives to the tort system in "the welfare state"-in
particular, the workers' compensation system-while the present
character of the plaintiffs' bar, and tort law in action, stands this cri-
tique on its head. 25 It is the plaintiffs' bar that now exercises virtually
unchecked private (as opposed to public) discretion in shaping acci-
dent law through the various features of its organization and settle-
ment practices.2 6
What relevance do these observations have for my discussion here?
In my view, Witt's thesis in amended form contributes to the founda-
tional critique of tort replacement efforts. As he sees it, the private
bar waged a largely successful campaign to promote the virtues of tort
law through a sustained attack on the administration of public bureau-
cracies mandated to compensate injury victims. 27 My own take distin-
guishes between the workers' compensation system-a creature of the
Progressive era-and the regulatory agencies established a generation
later under the New Deal.
As Witt suggests, the fledgling National Association of Claimants'
Compensation Attorneys (NACCA), the forerunner of today's Asso-
ciation of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), surely attacked the in-
equities of the workers' compensation system. Their efforts, however,
were largely aimed at the legislative forum in which benefit levels had
fallen woefully out-of-date, rather than at administration per se.28 By
25. Witt, supra note 5, at 261-63; see also JOHN FABIAN WIT, PATRIOTS AND COSMO-
POLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 211-78 (forthcoming 2007) (providing a
more expansive treatment in his chapter "The King and the Dean: Melvin Belli, Roscoe Pound,
and the Common-Law Nation").
26. See Witt, supra note 5, at 271; see also Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevita-
bility of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1571 (2004).
27. Witt, supra note 5, at 267-71.
28. The first volume of the NACCA Law Journal states the organization's position:
The workmen's compensation acts have many defects, and plaintiff's attorneys owe it
to injured workers and their dependents to help remedy the defects ....
NACCA members have already succeeded in helping to improve acts in various
states. In Massachusetts and Oregon they successfully supported amendments increas-
ing worker's rights. NACCA members can be particularly effective in plugging legal
loopholes, as many members of legislatures are lawyers, and understand the need of
such changes.
It is suggested that for the coming year, members concentrate (1) on bringing up
weekly payments to subsistence levels . . . (2) on giving the injured worker unlimited
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contrast, the broader attack on lawless administration waged by
ATLA-associated luminaries like Roscoe Pound was targeted at New
Deal agencies, which regulated under vague mandates to pursue "the
public interest. '2 9 But these latter agencies had very limited, if any,
intersection with the operation of the tort system.
In my view, Witt's observations about the comparative institutional
competence of private and public bureaucracies have real bite one
generation later, in what I have referred to elsewhere as the Public
Interest Era.30 It was then, beginning in the late 1960s, that agencies
like the CPSC and the NHTSA were established, agencies whose reg-
ulatory authority intersects with the domain of tort law.31 At that
point, it seems to me, Witt's reservations about jettisoning tort-from
medical payments ... (3) on securing complete occupational disease coverage, and (4)
complete compulsory coverage of all workers ....
Legislation: Workmen's Compensation, I NACCA L.J. 114, 114 (1948).
29. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). Professor Shepherd recounted the
history:
[E]mploying rhetoric that likened opposition to administrative reform to communism
and fascism, Pound's committee attacked the New Deal agencies and their "Adminis-
trative Absolutism"-the title of the central section of the ABA Committee's July 1938
report.... [Tihe committee endorsed strong judicial controls of agency action because
"an administrative agency is not unlikely to have been set up to get things done in the
interest of one side which controls or has the favor of the executive for the time being."
Id. at 1590-91 (alteration omitted) (quoting Report of the Special Committee on Administrative
Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 342 (1938)); see also WrrT-, supra note 25, at 231-33.
30. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1278-95 (1986).
31. The predecessor agency to the FDA was established a half century earlier, but its regula-
tory mandate was not sufficiently expansive to intersect with products liability law until roughly
the same period. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757-68 (1996) (providing a historical summary of the expansion
of FDA authority from 1906 to 1962). Professor Merrill observed that the early incarnation of
the FDA relied on court actions to enforce specific prohibitions mostly targeting deceptive label-
ing practices, whereas in the 1938 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52
Stat. 1040 (1938), Congress required premarket notification to the FDA, and in the 1962 amend-
ments to the Act, Congress finally imposed FDA premarket approval requirements on drug
manufacturers. Id.; see also PETER BARTON Hu'rr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, Preface to the 1980
Edition of FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxi (2d ed. 1991). Professors Hutt
and Merrill discussed the history of food and drug law:
The 1906 [Food and Drug] Act predated by nearly a decade creation of the Federal
Trade Commission and by a full half-century the establishment of other agencies-such
as .. .the Consumer Product Safety Commission-that have a consumer protection
role.
[But] until the 1970's food and drug law did not command the attention of a large
number of lawyers.... [This was due in part to] the comparatively modest resources of
the Food and Drug Administration.
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his vantage point, not through preemption, but by draconian restric-
tions on the plaintiffs' bar-become salient.32
Witt addresses his critique primarily to public compensation alter-
natives to the tort system, rather than to administrative regulation
(that is, the current preemption context). But it resonates
nonetheless:
The private tort system may be more flexible than public compensa-
tion programs. [Consider, on this score, public regulatory systems,
as well.] With its decentralized system of judges, juries, lawyers,
and insurance adjusters, it may also be less susceptible to capture by
well-organized interest groups. Public compensation values are set
by a political process that has proven itself susceptible to dysfunc-
tional interest group politics .... [The damage values in tort] are
continuously tested and retested in courtrooms, which serve as price
coordinators for the private administration of claims.33
Rather than pressing Witt's observations further beyond the public
compensation context, let me turn to a set of reservations about di-
minishing the scope of tort that I offered in an article a few years
ago.34 As I suggested there, the regulatory compliance defense is a
close cousin to preemption. 35 Regulatory compliance is a common-
law tort defense that allows a court to defer to agencies as a matter of
comity, and absolves a defendant of liability when there has been
compliance with regulations addressing the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim, even when there is no explicit or implicit legislative
mandate to preempt. In short, the practical impact of recognizing a
regulatory compliance defense would be precisely the same as a suc-
cessful interposition of a preemption claim. Tort would be displaced;
the rationale would simply differ. Judicial deference would serve as
the underpinning, rather than judicial obligation based on constitu-
tional dictates of the Supremacy Clause. 36
But courts have, in fact, been quite leery about recognizing a regu-
latory compliance defense for reasons, in my view, that carry over to
unease about agency-initiated preemption. 37 Those who extol the vir-
32. Interestingly, California's widely noted and highly influential set of restrictions on plaintiff
attorney's fees was enacted roughly contemporaneously with the new era of expanded regula-
tory authority. California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), CAL. CiV.
PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1987).
33. Witt, supra note 5, at 272.
34. Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
35. Id. at 2053-60.
36. Note that agency-initiated preemption by preamble would have consequences similar to
congressional/legislative preemption: where applicable, it would obviate the need for a regula-
tory compliance defense.
37. It is critical to keep in mind that preemption by preamble, or agency-initiated preemption,
is not an obligation of the regulatory agency-it is a policy choice rather than a mandate. As
[Vol. 56:293
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tues of regulatory preemption tend to ignore the costs. Most obvi-
ously, victims are left without compensation when the defendant's
conduct conforms to regulatory standards but causes injury nonethe-
less.38 Indeed, in the absence of a private right of action-sharply cir-
cumscribed by Supreme Court rulings, as discussed above 39-victims
may be left without recompense even when regulatory standards are
not met, if the scope of agency authority is taken to "occupy the field."
Moreover, if the regulatory standards are underenforced or the reg-
ulatory penalties are minimal, there may be a shortfall not only in
compensation, but in deterrence as well. Unless it operates in tandem
with a legislative compensation scheme, regulation promotes only de-
terrence. Tort, whatever its shortcomings, does double-duty: it is an
engine of compensation as well as deterrence. 40
The deterrence side of the ledger requires further discussion, be-
cause regulation in practice frequently suffers from structural infirmi-
ties. Witt notes in passing that tort is less susceptible to capture by
well-organized interest groups.4' Beyond that long-standing realpoli-
tik observation, however, are more subtle considerations. There is the
all-too-familiar pattern of underfunded or myopic regulators who fail
Sharkey points out, in earlier years, the three agencies that she discusses largely favored treating
tort as a complementary rather than a competitive regime; i.e., they disavowed any preemptive
intent. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 229-42.
38. One might argue that compliance with regulations creates a presumption-or per se
case-of due care. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Lia-
bility: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000) (discussing the proposal for
"carefully tailored" recognition of a regulatory compliance defense in the American Law Insti-
tute's report on enterprise responsibility for personal injury). But from a federalism perspective,
in my view, this is an inadequate supporting rationale for the defense. A state might decide, in
the absence of constitutionally based preemption, that its citizens should have a strict liability
claim to compensation and protection from injury, whatever the correspondence of a negligence
inquiry with the regulatory standard-setting process. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (articulating this federalism argument). In fact, with
important qualifications, strict liability is the evolutionary path that products liability law has
taken. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 353 (2000) (providing succinct treatment).
39. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
40. Regarding those shortcomings, the criticisms of the tort system are of course voluminous.
See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 1-72 (1989)
(presenting a systematic catalogue). A principal focus has been the strikingly high costs of deliv-
ering tort dollars to injury victims. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986). Witt's article offers an interesting slant
on this concern, focusing on the "price stickiness" of plaintiff attorney's fees, and providing a
historical view of past efforts to adopt lay claims brokers systems. See Witt, supra note 5, at
279-80; see also infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
41. Witt, supra note 5, at 272; see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1064-70 (1990).
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to monitor effectively once regulatory standards have been set.42 And
there is the pervasive reliance by agencies on industry data in setting
standards, data that are at times insensitive to long-term risks. 43
Agencies also sometimes engage in what might be termed boot-strap
certification, which relies largely on prior approval of supposedly simi-
lar risk-bearing products as a shortcut around meaningful cost-benefit
analysis of a "me-too" submission. 44
There is also the educational effect of tort. Pretrial discovery has
frequently unearthed both industry and regulatory agency practices
that might otherwise never have seen the light of day.4 5 This was true
in the modern era of mass tort products litigation with asbestos, and
has carried through to tobacco and other widely noted recent contro-
versies over industry concealment of information about risk (breast
implants, Vioxx, antidepressants, among others). The short of it is
that "tort-as-compared-to-what" turns out to raise a complicated set
of concerns about comparative institutional competence.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In our system, the principal instance in which tort has been replaced
by complementary regimes-regimes promoting respectively compen-
sation and deterrence-is the realm of industrial injuries, where state
workers' compensation programs displace tort in providing monetary
benefits to injured workers, and the Occupational Health and Safety
42. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., STATE RE-
FERRAL OF NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT CASES (2005), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/re-
ports/oei-06-03-00400.pdf (detailing the inadequate enforcement of regulatory standards for
nursing home care); INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PRO-
TECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (2006) (discussing internal management conflicts at the
FDA between officials responsible for initial and postmarketing review of new drugs, and criti-
cizing in particular, postmarketing surveillance).
43. See Lawyers Argue Merck Concealed Vioxx Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at C4 (citing
Merck's lead lawyer in the Vioxx litigation, who stated that "[tihis was no rush to market," and
noting that "Merck willingly provided data from its clinical studies of Vioxx to the [FDA], which
approved it as 'safe and effective' on four occasions"). Implicitly, of course, the FDA had to rely
on the data it received from Merck. See Editorial, Looking for Adverse Drug Effects, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A14 (criticizing as "problematic" that "the prime responsibility for
collecting and evaluating data from postmarketing studies rests with the [drug] manufacturers").
44. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (discussing a case brought under the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, which provide a fast-track process where approval is
sought for a "substantially equivalent" product to one already on the market).
45. See Rabin, supra note 34, at 2068-70. More generally, a counterargument to the legiti-
mate concern that early tort awards in a mass injury context may trigger spurious claims is that
large-scale coverage in the popular press may alert affected people to watch for signs of illness,
and to seek redress for injury while the evidence of wrongful conduct is still fresh and the defen-
dant has resources to pay judgments.
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Administration (OSHA) addresses workplace safety from a regula-
tory perspective. 46
Replicating this dual model elsewhere would pose major difficul-
ties.47 To stay with Sharkey's cases, the CPSC cannot conceivably
monitor the entire universe of consumer products for safety. Indeed,
CPSC promulgations of design standards for specific products have
been few and far between.48 Nor is it clear how a broad-based, prod-
uct injury, no-fault compensation scheme would deal with the count-
less instances in which injured consumers misuse products or are
simply inattentive to commonplace risks.
Comprehensive auto design regulation by the NHTSA is not politi-
cally feasible and would straitjacket consumer choice in a fashion that
would be universally regarded as unacceptable. On the compensation
side, victims of motor vehicle accidents arising out of auto defects are
compensated under no-fault auto legislation-where it has been
adopted-like any other auto accident victims. But even the most
generous of these schemes supplements tort rather than replaces it,
and most provide only minimal benefits. 49
46. Even here, tort plays an important continuing role, in particular, for third-party litigation
against manufacturers of injury-producing machinery found defective. See FRANKLIN, RABIN &
GREEN, supra note 4, at 628-48. And workers' compensation regimes do provide a measure of
deterrence (that is, incentives to promote safety), entirely apart from OSHA. See infra note 54.
47. Note that this complementarity is not by virtue of a grand design. Workers' compensation
statutes were enacted state by state; in contrast, OSHA is a federal scheme. Moreover, OSHA
was enacted in 1970, a half century after most states had adopted workers' compensation plans.
48. See Teresa M. Schwartz & Robert S. Adler, Product Recalls: A Remedy in Need of Repair,
34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 462 (1984) (recounting the formative years and noting that
"[r]ecalls have virtually supplanted standards as the primary regulatory tool of the CPSC"). This
is hardly surprising, as the CPSC was, from the outset, ineffective at promulgating regulatory
standards. Indeed, the act establishing the CPSC also put in place such a problematic adminis-
trative procedural framework that the agency had little chance to carry out its mission until
Congress changed that framework in 1981, at which point the Reagan administration's push for
less regulation ensured that the CPSC would have a modest role in ensuring consumer product
safety through affirmative regulation. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 181-82 (1997)
(observing that the CPSC was badly handicapped from doing much of anything during the first
decade of its existence because Congress imposed mass participation requirements on the agency
that were not abandoned until 1981). See generally Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Be-
tween Product Liability and Product Safety-Understanding a Necessary Element in European
Product Liability Through a Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305 (2000).
49. There is a realpolitik concern here that leads back to the origins of the NACCA-ack of
legislative generosity on compensation levels and the failure to update them. Consider the New
York no-fault statute, where the comparatively generous basic economic loss coverage is $50,000.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(a) (McKinney 2000). That figure has not been adjusted for changes in the
cost of living since the statute was first enacted in 1973.
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In contrast to the CPSC and the NHTSA, FDA regulation is com-
prehensive, at least as far as prescription drugs are concerned. 50
Agency approval is required before new prescription pharmaceutical
products are marketed, and the certification process is meant to assure
rigorous cost-benefit analysis along the dimensions of safety and effi-
cacy. But injuries occur nonetheless. In some cases, drugs have side
effects that were unanticipated by the agency when they were ap-
proved for sale, even if they should have been anticipated by the drug
manufacturer. 51 In such cases, the absence of recourse to tort would
mean no recovery for drug-related harm. A no-fault compensation
scheme for prescription drug-related harms would fill the gap, but this
possibility has never been taken seriously in the legislative arena. 52
Indeed, the character of drug-related injuries, which are frequently
incurred by individuals who are very sick, would often require proof-
intensive causation controversies to establish eligibility for no-fault
compensation, and would mirror tort in that regard.
Rather than comprehensively addressing the goals of tort, agency-
initiated preemption simply pokes holes in the fabric of the tort sys-
tem on a case-by-case basis; this is not a very satisfying approach from
a horizontal equity perspective-entirely apart from the intrinsic mer-
its of retaining tort discussed above. Do considerations of uniformity,
predictability, and expertise nonetheless warrant the override of the
complementarity between regulation and tort? A stronger case can
be made for injury compensation schemes than for preemptive regula-
tory regimes, because the no-fault model does in fact address, to some
extent, both compensation and deterrence.53 Consider, for example,
the childhood vaccine compensation scheme. 54 But in my view, the
50. Drug Amendments of 1962 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L.
No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397).
51. For a more detailed analysis of the drug approval scenarios that undermine the case for
preclusion of tort law, see Rabin, supra note 34, at 2074-84.
52. For a proposal of a prescription drug no-fault scheme, see Richard A. Merrill, Compensa-
tion for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1 (1973). The fact that such a scheme has
never received serious consideration from legislators is evident in the relative uniqueness of the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2000)) [hereinafter Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act]. The vaccine compensation system has never been expanded to any other area of products
liability or medical-related injuries. Indeed, only in a very few situations, including most recently
the 9/11 attacks, has Congress created some form of no-fault compensation system. See Robert
L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REv. 699, 703-13 (2005)
(discussing some of the major no-fault legislation and proposals adopted since 1970).
53. No-fault benefits, such as workers' compensation insurance coverage, obviously constitute
a cost of doing business for the risk-generating firm.
54. Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)-(d) (providing a limited tort op-
tion for claimants, rather than strictly replacing it).
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costs-in departure from horizontal equity among categories of acci-
dent victims, in failure to provide adequate compensation, and in sub-
optimal deterrence-suggest placing the burden on reformers to make
the case for displacing tort.
Incremental reform of the sort discussed by Witt is another matter.
His initial premise is that tort has many virtues from a comparative
institutional perspective. 55 But like all thoughtful observers of the tort
system, Witt is also keenly aware of its shortcomings. Indeed, his focal
point is the long-standing and widely shared criticism that "the virtues
of tort law are enormously expensive." 56 At the same time, his path to
reform is one that is seldom taken. Rather than joining the refrain for
capping plaintiff attorney's fees,57 Witt would address the price-sticki-
ness of contingency fees-clustering at one-third of recovered dam-
ages, when unconstrained by caps-by promoting lay claims
brokers.58 Ideally, these intermediaries would break down the infor-
mational asymmetries that limit the market power of injury victims
seeking legal representation.
I have no quarrel with Witt's proposition that lay claims brokers,
like mortgage brokers, might well "open the system up" by providing
more meaningful data to injury victims on attorney competence, and
thereby possibly stimulating some degree of price competition. How-
ever, systemic factors, such as the attorney-client privilege, and politi-
cal realities-namely, the powerful resistance of the organized bar-
sharply limit the prospect for any such reform.
If arming prospective tort plaintiffs with more information on attor-
ney competence would be a salutary move, it nonetheless seems to me
a second-best, and rather indirect, strategy for addressing the rents, to
the extent they exist, in contingency fee pricing, let alone for address-
ing the more foundational concerns about the strikingly high costs of
delivering tort compensation. The crux of the matter, in my view, is
the imprecise standards that characterize the law of tort-even under
55. Witt, supra note 5, at 262.
56. Id. at 277.
57. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It
Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65 (2003) (arguing that there is inadequate price com-
petition among plaintiffs' attorneys, resulting in contingency fees that are too high); Lester
Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes
Are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1776 (1994)
("To focus attention on lawyers' rates of return and their effects on tort litigation is to at least
implicitly suggest the possibility that too high a reward structure can yield socially undesirable
results. This Article explicitly states that thesis." (citation omitted)).
58. Witt, supra note 5, at 289-90.
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the private administrative regime of structured negotiation and high
volume settlement described by Witt.
If the fact-intensive, case-by-case standards of accident law were to
be reconstituted-in particular, open-ended discretion in determining
fault, monetizing intangible harm, and assessing causal responsibil-
ity-the costs of tort administration would fall dramatically. Indeed,
there are working models such as airplane crash litigation, where de-
terminations of fault, causation, and intangible loss are relatively rou-
tinized, and correspondingly, contingency fees and administrative
costs of the system are far less than in other mainstream categories of
tort cases.5
9
Needless to say, it would be a tall order to overhaul all of accident
law to eliminate discretionary determinations of fault and causation.
But just such an overhaul has taken place in many states with respect
to monetizing intangible harm.60 The problem is in the tort reform
strategy that has been employed in doing so. Just as Witt refers to the
perverse effects of capping attorney's fees, I have serious reservations
about the fairness of capping pain and suffering damages-and, as a
consequence, discriminating against recoveries in the most serious in-
jury cases-rather than adopting a scheduling approach that would
rely on discrete categories of specified harms with presumptive upper
and ,lower limits on recovery. But expansion on this point is beyond
the scope of this Article. 6'
Suffice to say that the old saw applies here: the baby should not be
thrown out with the bathwater. Before tort is disassembled, one
should count the costs. If the costs seem high, then one should look
for ways of improving the system before eliminating it. Finally, as in
the case of a robust auto no-fault system, the game is not necessarily
zero-sum; it may be that in some categories of accidental harm, a sub-
stantial baseline no-fault system, supplemented by tort for especially
grievous harms, offers a satisfying approach to the vexing problem of
addressing the costs of accidental injury.
59. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT
LITIGATION (1988).
60. In 2005, twenty-five states imposed some type of cap on noneconomic loss in medical
malpractice cases, and twenty-five states (not all the same ones) capped punitive damages in
such cases. See HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABIL-
ITY REFORM: LEGAL ISSUES AND FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES app. at CRS-11 (2005), available at http://shelby.senate.gov/legisla-
tion/MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
61. For more detailed discussion and references, see Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and
Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 373-77
(2006).
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